Social Security and Retirement around the World by Jonathan Gruber & David A. Wise
This PDF is a selection from an out-of-print volume from the National Bureau
of Economic Research
Volume Title: Social Security and Retirement around the World
Volume Author/Editor: Jonathan Gruber and David A. Wise, editors
Volume Publisher: University of Chicago Press
Volume ISBN: 0-226-31011-6
Volume URL: http://www.nber.org/books/grub99-1
Publication Date: January 1999
Chapter Title: Introduction to "Social Security and Retirement around the
World"
Chapter Author: Jonathan Gruber, David A. Wise
Chapter URL: http://www.nber.org/chapters/c7247
Chapter pages in book: (p. 1 - 35)Introduction and Summary 
Jonathan Gruber and David A. Wise 
In almost every industrialized country, the population is aging rapidly, and in- 
dividuals are living longer. These demographic trends have placed enormous 
pressure on the financial viability of the social security systems in these coun- 
tries. The financial pressure is compounded by another trend. In virtually every 
country, employees are leaving the labor force at younger and younger ages. In 
some countries, the labor force participation rates of  sixty- to sixty-four-year- 
old men have fallen by 75 percent over the past three decades. 
What accounts for the striking decline in labor force participation? One ex- 
planation is that social security provisions themselves provide enormous incen- 
tive to leave the labor force early, thus by their very structure exacerbating the 
financial problems they face. It is this aspect of social security plan provisions 
that is emphasized in this volume. By considering the relation between plan 
provisions, on the one hand, and labor force participation rates, on the other, 
we hope to draw attention to the important role that social security can play in 
the labor force decisions of older persons. 
This volume contains analyses based on evidence from eleven industrialized 
countries. In this summary, we attempt to distill key conclusions that can be 
drawn from the collective findings of the individual papers. The project relies 
on analyses of  social security provisions  and labor force participation  con- 
ducted by a number of economists in their own countries: Pierre Pestieau and 
Jean-Philippe Stijns in Belgium, Jonathan Gruber in Canada, Didier Blanchet 
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and Louis-Paul Pel6 in France, Axel Borsch-Supan and Reinhold Schnabel in 
Germany, Agar Brugiavini in Italy, Naohiro Yashiro and Takashi Oshio in Ja- 
pan, Arie Kapteyn and Klaas de Vos in the Netherlands, Michele Boldrin, Sergi 
Jimenez-Martin,  and Franco Peracchi in  Spain, Mken Palme and Ingemar 
Svensson in Sweden, Richard Blundell and Paul Johnson in the United King- 
dom, and Peter Diamond and Jonathan Gruber in the United States. 
The central feature of the project is an attempt to present comparable de- 
scriptive data and analytic calculations for each of these eleven countries. The 
country studies all follow the same format. Each begins with a description of 
the historical evolution of labor force participation and then presents data on 
the current age-specific activities and income sources of  men and women in 
terms of the following: (1) labor force participation rates by  age interval be- 
tween  1960 and the present;  (2) the proportion of  employees covered by the 
public pension system, and the proportion of persons over age fifty-five receiv- 
ing public pensions,  from 1960 to the present; (3) replacement rates under 
the public pension  system from 1960 to the present; (4) current labor force 
participation rates by age; (5) labor force status (employed, unemployed, dis- 
abled, retired); (5) proportion receiving various public “pensions” (e.g.,  old 
age, disability, survivor) by age; (6) proportions receiving employer-provided 
pensions by age; (7) source of household income by age; and (8) retirement 
and public pension hazard rates by age. In some instances, the presentation  is 
adjusted to match individual country circumstances; in other cases, additional 
information is presented that is particularly  important for a specific country. 
Each study then describes the institutional features of the country’s social secu- 
rity  system, highlighting any interactions with other public  and private pro- 
grams that might also influence retirement behavior. Finally, the core of each 
study is a detailed analysis of the retirement incentives inherent in the provi- 
sions of the given country’s retirement income system. By making the same 
analytic calculations, and by presenting the same simulations for each of the 
countries, the individual studies provide a means of comparing retirement in- 
centives among nations. 
We  begin  this  introduction by  describing the dramatic fall in labor force 
participation rates over the past three decades, the phenomenon that provides 
the primary motivation for this project. We then describe the decline in labor 
force participation with age that is reflected in current labor force patterns. We 
draw attention in particular to the forgone productive capacity implicit in the 
low participation rates of older persons. We then use data from several coun- 
tries to illustrate the relation between social security provisions and withdrawal 
from the labor force. These illustrative country data are also used to explain 
the key  methods  used in each of the country papers. We  also point out im- 
portant ways in which public and private policies differ among the countries, 
differences  that must  be  kept in  mind when  making  comparisons  between 
countries. Finally, we present  a summary of key  findings for all the coun- 3  Introduction and Summary 
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Fig. 1  Labor force participation trends for men aged 60 to 64 
tries, emphasizing the relation between social security provisions and retire- 
ment patterns. 
Labor Force Participation 
The Decline since 1960 
The decline in the labor force participation of older persons is one of the 
most dramatic features of labor force change over the past several decades. 
The decline has been striking in all but one of the countries studied here. The 
labor force participation  rates of  men  aged sixty to sixty-four for the years 
1960-66  are shown for each of the eleven countries in figure  1. The decline 
was substantial in each country but was much greater in some than in others. 
In the early 1960s, the participation rates were above 70 percent in each coun- 4  Jonathan Gruber and David A. Wise 
try and above 80 percent in several. By the mid-l990s, the rate had fallen to 
below 20 percent in Belgium, Italy, France, and the Netherlands, to about 35 
percent in Germany, and to 40 percent in Spain. Although U.S. analysts have 
often emphasized the “dramatic” fall in that country, the decline in the United 
States from 82 to 53 percent was modest in comparison to the much more 
precipitous decline in these European countries. The decline to 57 percent in 
Sweden was also large, but modest when compared to the fall in other coun- 
tries. Japan stands out with the smallest decline of all the countries, from about 
83 to 75 percent. The labor force participation rates of forty-five- to fifty-nine- 
year-old men, as well as of those age sixty and older, have also declined sub- 
stantially, and these trends can be seen in the individual country papers. 
Each  of the country papers  presents  completely parallel  labor force  and 
other data for men and women, including current labor force participation and 
departure rates by  age, which are key components of the analysis in this vol- 
ume. To simplify the exposition, and to limit the number of figures presented, 
we emphasize the data for men here. In addition, the cross-country compari- 
sons, which are made toward the end of the introduction, are more easily inter- 
preted  for men than for women.  In some respects, however, the labor force 
trends for older women are just as dramatic as those for men. Although the 
labor force participation rate of women of all ages combined has been increas- 
ing, this is not the pattern for older women. In seven of the ten countries for 
which data are available, the labor force participation rates of women aged 
sixty to sixty-four have been  declining in the past three decades-in  some 
cases by a factor of two-even  though the participation rate of women started 
from a much lower base in the early  1960s. In no country has there been a 
general increase in this age group, in spite of the sharp trend toward increasing 
participation rates of women at younger ages. In some countries-the  Nether- 
lands and Belgium, for example-the  participation rate since 1960 of women 
in this age group has never exceeded 10 percent! With the possible exception 
of one of the countries, the labor force participation rates of  women at older 
ages-which  have always been lower than the participation rates of men-are 
now  declining.  Most important,  the  current labor  force  departure rates  for 
women at older ages are quite consistent with the departure rates for men, as 
explained below. Perhaps most important, by looking at the individual country 
papers, it is clear that the same within-country incentives that affect the retire- 
ment patterns of  men apply equally to women. Indeed, women tend to leave 
the labor force at earlier ages than men. That is, women who are in the labor 
force at age sixty, for example, are typically more likely than men to retire at 
that age. In some countries, benefits are available at younger ages for women 
than for men. The incentives to leave the labor force-discussed  in detail be- 
low-and  the actual labor force departures at older ages appear to be at least 
as important for women as for men. 5  Introduction and Summary 
Fig. 2  Labor force participation by country and age 
The Decline with Age and “Unused Productive Capacity” 
The current relation between labor force participation  and age for men is 
shown for each of the countries in figure 2. The countries are ordered by labor 
force participation at age sixty-five. At age fifty, approximately 90 percent of 
men are in the labor force in all the countries. The decline after age fifty varies 
greatly among countries. By age sixty-nine, virtually no men in Belgium are 
working; in Japan, almost 50 percent are still in the labor force. Indeed, most 
men  in Belgium  are no longer in the labor force at age sixty-five, and only 
about 25 percent  are working  at age sixty. In Japan, on the other hand, 60 
percent are working at age sixty-five and 75 percent at age sixty. 
There are many implications of the withdrawal of older men from the work- 
force. Some have to do with the differential political influence of older and 
younger voters. Some have to do with the psychological well-being of older 
persons  as they age. We emphasize here the forgone productive capacity of 
older employees who leave the workforce. Figure 3a helps explain this idea 
and provides a simple way of comparing the extent of labor force withdrawal 
of  older men across countries. This figure shows the labor force participation 
of men aged fifty to sixty-nine in three countries: Japan, Spain, and Belgium. 
For Japan, consider the height above the LFP (labor force participation) curve, 
which is the proportion of men not working at a given age (1 -  LFP). Loosely 
speaking, we can refer to this measure as the unused productive  capacity at 
that age. If the unused capacity  is added up over all ages, we find the area 
above the LFP curve, Dividing by the total area of the figure (1 X  19) yields a 
rough measure of the unused capacity over the age range fifty to sixty-nine as 
a percentage of  the total labor capacity in that age range. In Japan, the value 
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Fig. 3  Labor force participation of men by age and country 7  Introduction and Summary 
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Fig. 4  Unused productive capacity 
many more older men are out of the labor force in Belgium, where the unused 
capacity measure is 61 percent. In Spain, the unused capacity measure is 48 
percent. 
We emphasize that these are only relative measures; there is no reason to 
assume that all men who are not working should, or could, work. In particular, 
this measure might differ across countries because of differences in health sta- 
tus. Or unused capacity may be higher in countries in which a larger proportion 
of jobs are physically  demanding.'  Nevertheless,  these enormous differences 
across fairly similar industrialized countries are striking. 
The labor force participation  profiles for the other countries are shown in 
figure 3b, c. For comparison, the profiles for Japan and Belgium are shown in 
each panel. The unused productive capacity measures for all the countries are 
shown in figure 4. For the entire age range from fifty to sixty-nine, the unused 
capacity measures range from a high of 61 percent in Belgium to a low of 23 
percent  in  Japan.  In  the  age range  fifty-five to  sixty-five, unused  capacity 
ranges from 67 percent in Belgium to 22 percent in Japan. We consider below 
how this relative measure is related  to the provisions  of  the  social security 
programs in the countries. 
1, In addition, our measure of unused capacity is crude. A more refined measure would account 
not only for participation but also for the nature of that participation, i.e., hours of work. It would 
account as well for the fact that moving from higher-paying (marginal product) jobs to lower- 
paying (marginal product) jobs increases unused capacity. For example, the higher labor force 
participation of older men in Japan may be due to less rigorous work in the secondary sector; we 
would therefore understate unused capacity for that country. Moreover, some of  what is called 
unused productive capacity may  include noumarket work, such as off-the-books handiwork or 
volunteer labor; this would lower measured unused capacity. An appropriate measurement of un- 
used capacity across countries is an important priority for future work. 8  Jonathan Gruber and David A. Wise 
The Incentive Effects of Plan Provisions 
The key feature of each of the chapters in this volume is the highly detailed 
computation of plan retirement incentives. In this section, we provide a very 
brief overview of the provisions of  social security plans that can create large 
retirement incentives. We then present evidence on how these incentives ap- 
pear to be reflected in retirement behavior. 
Two features of social security plans have an important effect on labor force 
participation incentives. The first is the age at which benefits are first available. 
This is called the early retirement age. The “normal”  retirement age is also 
important, but, as the data will show, it is typically much less important than 
the early retirement age. It may once have been that most people were expected 
to retire at the normal retirement age; now, in most countries, few people work 
until the normal retirement age. 
The extent to which people continue to work after the early retirement age 
is closely related to the second important feature of plan provisions, the pattern 
of benefit accrual. Suppose that, at a given age, a person has acquired entitle- 
ment to future benefits on retirement. The present discounted value of these 
benefits is the person’s social security wealth at that age (SSW,).  The key con- 
sideration for retirement decisions is how this wealth will evolve with contin- 
ued work. If a person is age fifty-nine, for example, what is the change in social 
security wealth if he retires at age sixty instead of age fifty-nine? The differ- 
ence between social security wealth if retirement is at age a and social security 
wealth if retirement is at age a + 1, SSWo+, -  SSWo, is called social security 
wealth accrual. 
We compare social security  wealth  accrual to net wage earnings over the 
year. If the accrual is positive, it adds to total compensation from working the 
additional  year;  if  the  accrual  is  negative,  it  reduces  total  compensation. 
The ratio of the accrual to net wage earnings is an implicit tax on earnings if 
the accrual is negative  and an implicit subsidy to earnings if the accrual is 
positive. Thus, a negative accrual discourages continuation in the labor force, 
and a positive accrual encourages continued labor force participation. This ac- 
crual rate, and the associated tax rate, is a key calculation that is made in the 
same way for each of the countries considered here. As it turns out, the pension 
accrual  is  typically  negative at older  ages:  continuation  in  the  labor force 
means a loss in the present value of  net pension benefits, which imposes an 
implicit tax on work and provides an incentive to leave the labor force.* 
The magnitude of social security wealth accrual and the corresponding tax 
or subsidy differ greatly from country to country and are determined by several 
provisions.  The most important determinant  of  accrual is the adjustment to 
2. While several authors have compared social security provisions in several countries-e.g., 
Kohli, Rein, Guillemard, and van Gunsteren (1991) and OECD (1995a. 1995b)-there  has been 
no analytic calculation of the incentive effects of plan provisions whose results were comparable 
across countries. 9  Introduction and Summary 
benefits if a person works for another year. An additional year of work means 
a delay in receiving benefits, which will be received for one less year. In some 
countries, an “actuarial” adjustment is made, increasing benefits to offset the 
fact that they are received  for fewer years.  But, in other countries, no such 
adjustment is made. The greater the adjustment, the greater the inducement to 
continue working. If the adjustment  is not  large enough to offset the fewer 
years that benefits are received, however, there is an incentive to leave the labor 
force. Second, a person who continues to work must pay social security taxes 
on earnings, lowering net social security accrual. These tax payments make 
retirement more attractive. Third, the additional year of earnings is often used 
to recompute social security benefits, which are typically based on some mea- 
sure of  lifetime average earnings. Since earnings are often higher later in life 
than earlier, this may raise net accrual, making retirement less attractive. This 
effect  may  be  especially  important  for the younger  old, who are not  fully 
“vested” in their social security systems until they have paid in for some mini- 
mal number of years. Finally, a delay in receiving benefits raises the odds that 
the worker might die before being able to collect any benefits. This lowers net 
social security accrual and may be an important consideration for the oldest 
workers. 
In addition to social security plan provisions, other government and private 
programs may also affect the relation between social security plan provisions 
and observed retirement patterns. One is the availability of employer-provided 
pension plans. For example, half the employees in the United States are cov- 
ered by  employer-provided plans, about half  of  which  are “defined-benefit’’ 
plans that have substantial retirement incentive effects, as emphasized by Stock 
and Wise (1990a, 1990b) and Lumsdaine, Stock, and Wise (1991,1992,1994). 
In most European countries, employer-provided plans are much less prevalent; 
the most important exceptions are the United Kingdom and the Netherlands. 
The other programs that may have an important effect on retirement are unem- 
ployment  and disability  insurance.  In  many  European countries,  these pro- 
grams essentially provide early retirement  benefits before the official social 
security early retirement age. While these other programs affect the compari- 
sons that are made here, the basic relation between social security plan provi- 
sions and retirement is typically quite clear. In cases where these plans  are 
especially important, the country studies have incorporated them into the “so- 
cial security” incentive calculations. 
Country-Specific Examples 
To illustrate the relation between social security plan provisions and retire- 
ment behavior, we draw on the data for three countries: Germany, France, and 
the United States. The analysis of incentive effects presented in this volume 
pertains primarily to current country social security systems or to the systems 
as they existed until recently. Data for these three countries, however, allow a 10  Jonathan Gruber and David A. Wise 
simple within-country comparison of change in plan provisions over time and 
the corresponding change in the labor force participation of older people. The 
experience  of  these countries also highlights  a feature of  retirement that is 
common  to all countries, the concentration  of  retirement  at social  security 
early and normal retirement ages. These three examples also help draw atten- 
tion to the features of other social programs-disability  and unemployment, 
in particular-that  often interact with the social security program in a country. 
In the final section, we discuss the overall evidence from the eleven countries 
and draw general conclusions on the basis of between-country comparisons. 
The German Case 
The German experience provides a clean example: a large fraction of em- 
ployees is covered by the social security system, but few employees are covered 
by  employer-provided  pension  plans,  and such plans that do exist typically 
provide small benefits. On the other hand, “retirement”  is to some extent en- 
couraged in Germany by liberal disability and unemployment programs in ad- 
dition to the social security plan provisions. 
Before 1972, the social security retirement age in Germany was sixty-five, 
except for disability, and there was no social security early retirement age. But 
1972 legislation provided for early retirement at age sixty for women and at 
age sixty-three for men (given the accumulation of required  social security 
work years). In addition, the liberal use of disability and unemployment bene- 
fits effectively  expanded  the early retirement  option. In a large fraction of 
cases, social security early retirement benefits were made available with no 
reduction in benefits; benefits taken at the early retirement age were the same 
as if they were taken at the normal retirement age. This greatly increased the 
net tax on work since delaying retirement simply reduced the number of years 
that one could receive benefits, without increasing the annual benefit. 
In fact, there was a dramatic response to this increase in retirement incen- 
tives. Over the next few years, the mean retirement age of white-collar workers 
was reduced by 5.5 years, as shown in figure 5.3 
The correspondence  between  plan  provisions  and retirement  can also be 
demonstrated by considering the relation between retirement and social secu- 
rity provisions at apoint in time. The detailed provisions of the 1972 legislation 
are mirrored in retirement rates by age. Figure 6 shows the proportion of men 
employed at a given age who retire at that age-the  hazard, or departure, rate. 
The ages of key plan provisions are also noted on the figure so that the corre- 
spondence between provisions and retirement can be easily seen. Men who are 
“disabled’ or “unemployed” at age sixty and have been employed for a certain 
number of years under the social security system are eligible for early retire- 
ment at that age. There is a corresponding large jump in the retirement rate at 
that age. Men who have been employed for thirty-five years are eligible for 
3. The mean retirement age is the average age of persons retiring in a given year. 11  Introduction  and Summary 
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Fig. 6  Hazard and labor force participation rates for Germany 
Nutet ER = early retirement: NR = normal retirement. 
early retirement at age sixty-three, and there is a corresponding jump in the 
retirement rate at that age. The normal retirement age is sixty-five, and there is 
a corresponding spike at that age as well. By age sixty-five, however, fewer 
than 29 percent of  men are still in the labor force. In addition, even before 
age sixty, liberal interpretation of disability and unemployment plan provisions 
effectively  serves  to  provide  early  retirement  benefits  (discussed  further 
below). 
But retirement eligibility may not by itself induce retirement. In Germany, a 
high price is paid for not retiring if eligible. Consider, for example, the pros- 
pects faced by a man with median earnings whose wife is three years younger 
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Fig. 7  Tax rates on work in Germany 
eligible for disability benefits  were he to leave the labor force. Suppose he 
could retire at age sixty but was considering postponing retirement until age 
sixty-five. The receipt of benefits for five fewer years would not be offset by 
larger benefits. Indeed, the present value of benefits if taken at age sixty-five 
would be much less than the present value of benefits if taken at age sixty; that 
is, the social security accrual rate is negative. Were retirement postponed by 
five years, the present value of the benefits would fall by almost 18 percent. 
Delaying retirement from age sixty to age sixty-one would reduce benefits by 
over 4 percent. This large negative  accrual rate implies a substantial tax on 
additional work. The 4 percent reduction in benefits from delaying retirement 
to age sixty-one is equivalent to a tax of roughly 35 percent on the net wage 
earnings from working an additional year. This represents an enormous dis- 
incentive to continued work. 
The tax rates on earnings for each additional year in the labor force from 
age fifty-five to age seventy are shown in figure 7. It is clear that the cost of 
postponing retirement is very large; a large fraction of what would be gained 
in wage earnings if the person worked between age sixty and age sixty-five, 
for example, is lost by way of reduced pension benefits. Thus, a large fraction 
of employees retire as soon as they are eligible. 
The net effect on labor force participation is illustrated in figure 8, which 
describes the labor force status of  men by age.4 Retirement under the social 
security plan begins at age sixty, and labor force participation declines rapidly 
thereafter; by age sixty-five, virtually all men are retired under the social secu- 
rity retirement system. 
4. Note that the labor force participation figures given here do not correspond exactly to the 
hazard rates shown earlier. The labor force status estimates are based on a nationally representative 
micro-data survey, while the hazard rate estimates are taken from administrative data on pension 
receipt. 13  Introduction and Summary 
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Fig. 8  Status of men by age in Germany 
This figure also illustrates the interaction of the social security system and 
other programs. The labor force participation of men starts to fall well before 
the social security early retirement age. Indeed, at age fifty-nine-just  before 
the social security early retirement age-only  about 50 percent of employees 
are still in the labor force. The fall coincides with the increase in the proportion 
of men who are receiving unemployment benefits and the proportion receiving 
disability benefits. These programs in effect provide retirement benefits before 
the social security early retirement age. At age sixty, most of  those receiving 
unemployment, and many of those receiving disability benefits, switch to re- 
ceiving social security benefits instead. At age sixty-five, all those receiving 
disability benefits switch to social security. 
The French Case 
The experience in  France  provides  another  illustration  of  the  effect of 
changes in plan provisions. Prior to 1972, the normal social security retirement 
age in France was sixty-five, and early retirement provisions were uncommon. 
In the early  1970s, early retirement provisions were introduced by  way of a 
guaranteed income for persons age sixty and over who lost their jobs. In 1983, 
sixty became the normal retirement age. In addition, guaranteed income was 
provided for persons age fifty-seven and older who lost their jobs. 
The effect of this series of reforms is easily seen in the panels of figure 9, 
which show the distribution of social security retirement ages of several co- 
horts-those  attaining age sixty in 1972, 1978, 1982, and 1986, respectively. 
(These figures must be distinguished from those in, for example, fig. 6 above 
for Germany, which shows hazard or departure rates; fig. 9 shows the distribu- 
tion of retirement ages.) In the early 197Os, the modal retirement age was sixty- 
five, as shown for the cohort that reached age sixty in 1972 (and age sixty-five 14  Jonathan Gruber and David A. Wise 
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60 in 1982; d,  Age 60 in 1986 
in  1977). But, as early as 1963, special allowances were provided for some 
workers who became unemployed at age sixty or older, perhaps reflected in the 
small spike at age sixty. Beginning in 1972, a “resource maintenance” program 
provided grants equal 60-70  percent of last earnings to persons who became 
unemployed between age sixty and age sixty-four. The effect of these programs 
seems to be reflected in the increasing proportion of workers retiring at age 
sixty, as shown in the  second and third (1978 and  1982) panels of  figure 9. 
Such allowances were also provided for younger workers in some industry 
sectors. In addition, early retirement before age sixty-five was available under 
some pension plans. In  1983, sixty became the normal social security retire- 
ment age (and guaranteed income was provided for persons age fifty-seven and 
older who lost their jobs). Shortly after that, the modal retirement age did in- 
deed become sixty, as shown in the panel for the cohort reaching age sixty 
in 1986. 15  Introduction and Summary 
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Fig. 9 (cont.)  Retirement ages in France 
As in Germany, the current labor force departure rates in France also corre- 
spond closely to social security provisions. And, like the German provisions, 
the French social security provisions also impose a large tax on continued em- 
ployment past the early retirement eligibility age, as shown in figure 10. The 
implicit tax on continued labor force participation earnings at age sixty is close 
to 70 percent. The negative tax rates (large subsidy) prior to age fifty-eight 
reflect the sharp increases in social security entitlement for continuing in the 
labor force during these years; workers receive much lower social security ben- 
efits unless they work until that age. But the incentive to stay in the labor force 
provided by this accrual is largely canceled by the guaranteed income for per- 
sons who become unemployed at age fifty-seven and older. The age-specific 
rates of departure from the labor force in France are shown in figure  11. Ap- 
proximately  60 percent of employees who remain in the labor force until the 
social security early retirement age-sixty-retire  then. But, even before that 16  Jonathan Gruber and David A. Wise 
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Note:  ER = early retirement; NR = normal retirement: SS = social security. 
Hazard rates for France 
age, departure rates are substantial, apparently reflecting the guaranteed in- 
come provisions for employees who become unemployed, even if they are not 
eligible for social security benefits. Thus, as in Germany, there is a large incen- 
tive to take retirement benefits once they are available. 
The U.S.  Case 
As in Germany and France, changes in the age of eligibility for social secu- 
rity benefits in the United States had a large effect on retirement behavior. This 
pattern is illustrated in figure 12, which shows the hazard rates out of the labor 
force for men in  1960, 1970, and 1980 (from Burtless and Moffitt 1984). In 
1960, the normal retirement age was sixty-five, and there was no opportunity 
for early retirement under social security. In that year, the hazard rate was low A  1960 
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Fig. 12 
Source: Burtless and Moffitt (1984). 
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Fig. 13  Hazard rates for the United States 
Note; ER  = early retirement; NR = normal retirement; SS = social security. 
until age sixty-five, when the departure rate jumped precipitously, reflecting 
the availability of  social security benefits. 
In 1961, early eligibility for retirement benefits for men at age sixty-two was 
intr~duced.~  The effect of the introduction of early retirement on labor force 
departure rates is striking. Starting in 1970, and visible most clearly in 1980, 
there was a dramatic increase in the departure rate at age sixty-two and a corre- 
sponding decrease at age sixty-five. As a result, since 1980, the highest rate of 
labor force departure has been  at age sixty-two.6 Thus, as in Germany and 
France, in the United States the data suggest a very strong influence of social 
security incentives on retirement. 
There is also, as in France and Germany, a strong, contemporaneous corre- 
spondence in the United States between social security early and normal retire- 
ment ages and departure from the labor force, as shown in figure 13. But there 
is a noticeable difference between the U.S. departure rates and those in France 
and  Germany;  the  departure  rates  in  the  United  States  are  much  lower. 
Whereas,  in France and Germany, the departure rates at the social security 
early retirement age are approximately 60 percent, in the United States the 
departure rate is only about 25 percent. 
The difference corresponds to large differences in the tax on continued wage 
earnings. The tax in the United States is shown in figure 14. At age sixty-two, 
the tax rate in the United States is essentially zero, whereas in France the tax 
at the early retirement age (sixty) is close to 70 percent. In Germany, the tax 
rates just at and after the early retirement age are about 40 percent. 
5. It had been introduced for women in 1956. 
6.  This evolution proceeded fairly slowly. A similar pattern is seen in Canada, as documented 
by Baker and Benjamin (1996): early retirement at age sixty was introduced in 1987, but not until 
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Fig. 14  Tax rates on work in the United States 
There are four reasons why  the tax rate at the early retirement  age is so 
much lower in the United States. First, the “replacement rate” is much lower 
in the United States; thus, wage earnings  exceed social security benefits  by 
much more than in Germany or France. At age sixty-two, social security re- 
places about 41 percent of previous earnings on average, whereas, at age sixty, 
the replacement rate is 62 percent in Germany and 91 percent in France. Aside 
from other features of the programs, higher replacement rates increase the re- 
tirement incentives in Germany and France. The benefit forgone is much lower 
in the United States. Second, between  age sixty-two and age sixty-five, the 
U.S. system provides an actuarial adjustment to benefits if their receipt is de- 
layed, which offsets to a large extent the fewer years benefits  are received. 
There is no actuarial adjustment in Germany or France.’ Third, payroll tax rates 
to finance the program are much lower in the United States, which lowers the 
tax on additional work. Finally, the U.S. system allows higher earnings later in 
life to replace low earnings in earlier years; this is not true in Germany, but it 
can occur in France. 
After  the  normal  retirement  age  (sixty-five), however,  tax  rates  become 
much higher in the United States, approaching 50 percent by age seventy. This 
is primarily because the actuarial adjustment after age sixty-five is much less 
than the “fair” rate-that  which would be required to equate the expected pres- 
ent value of benefits if their initial receipt is delayed. 
Finally, figure 13 shows an increase in departure rates around age fifty-five, 
well before the social security early retirement age. A similar but much more 
pronounced  pattern  is evident in  figures  6 and  11 above  for Germany  and 
France, respectively. In those countries, the increase is associated with the re- 
ceipt of unemployment and/or disability benefits. In the United States, on the 
other hand, the increase is apparently associated with employer-provided pen- 
sion plan early retirement ages, which are common at fifty-five and are typi- 
7. Reforms in 1992 introduced such an adjustment in Germany. 20  Jonathan Gruber and David A. Wise 
cally between fifty-five and sixty. The estimated hazard rates in figure  13 are 
imprecise, however, and thus do not show a precise increase at age fifty-five.R 
To summarize,  these three country illustrations make clear the very close 
correspondence between retirement ages and the statutory social security eligi- 
bility for early and normal retirement benefits. In all three cases, there are large 
jumps in labor force departure rates at the early retirement  age in particular 
and at the normal retirement age as well. The correspondence is demonstrated 
most convincingly by within-country changes in retirement behavior over time, 
which follow on changes in statutory provisions. In addition, the jump in de- 
parture  rates,  at the  early retirement  age in particular,  appears to be  much 
greater in countries where the tax on continued work is large (Germany and 
France) than in countries where it is smaller (the United States). We turn now 
to an overview of the conclusions that seem warranted on the basis of the com- 
bined results in all eleven countries. 
All Countries 
In distilling the evidence from all the countries studied in this volume, three 
features of the data stand out. First, as in the three country illustrations, there 
is a strong correspondence between early and normal retirement ages and de- 
parture from the labor force.  Second, the social security provisions in most 
countries place a heavy tax burden on work past the age of  early retirement 
eligibility and thus provide a strong incentive to withdraw from the labor force 
early. Third, the tax-and  thus the incentive to leave the labor force-varies 
substantially among countries. So does retirement behavior. Thus, by consider- 
ing comparisons across the countries, we are able to draw general conclusions 
about the relation between the tax penalty on work and retirement behavior. 
Although  the between-country  comparisons suggest a rather  strong relation 
between these provisions and retirement-in  particular,  the unused capacity 
measure-we  do not attempt to assign quantitative magnitudes to the effects. 
We  will try to summarize the results for all the countries, however, in a way 
that makes clear that economic incentives to retire are indeed associated with 
early departure from the labor force. More precise quantitative estimates of the 
effects of specific provisions must await more formal analy~is.~ 
Early Retirement Provisions und Departure Rates 
Perhaps the easiest way to see the relation between departure rates and early 
retirement provisions is to consider graphs of hazard rates for each of the coun- 
tries,  like  those  shown  above  for Germany, France, and the  United  States. 
8. This jump in the hazard rate is more apparent in  longitudinal data, as shown in Welch and 
9. Some analyses are reviewed on a country-by-country basis in appendices to the individual 
Peracchi (1994). 
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These are shown for men in the first of the two panels that are presented for 
each country individually in figures  1% through  1%. The top panel for each 
country also shows the labor force participation rates by age for each country. 
It is evident that there is typically a strong correspondence between retirement 
plan provisions and labor force departure rates. In virtually every country, there 
is a sharp jump in the departure rate at the social security early retirement age, 
when employees are first eligible for benefits."' In every country, there is also 
a jump in departure at the normal retirement age. We emphasize the early re- 
tirement age, however, because in most countries only a small fraction of men 
remain in the labor force until the normal retirement age. Thus, the large depar- 
ture rates at the normal retirement age apply to only a small fraction of  em- 
ployees. 
Although the social security early retirement age is the most critical of plan 
provisions,  as emphasized above, in many countries unemployment and dis- 
ability programs effectively provide early retirement at younger ages. The ef- 
fects of  these programs  are reflected in the departure rates before the social 
security  early retirement  ages. To  understand  the  implications of  departure 
rates, it is useful to have in mind a few illustrations of their cumulative effect: 
if 5 percent of those still employed leave each year, after five years 24 percent 
will have left. If  10 percent leave each year, 41 percent will have left over five 
years; if 20 percent leave each year, 67 percent will have left over five years. 
The effects of unemployment and disability programs seem especially evident 
in Belgium, France, the Netherlands, and Germany, where labor force depar- 
ture rates approach or exceed 20 percent before the social security early retire- 
ment age. (These programs are also labeled on the first panels of fig. 15.) In 
contrast, in Sweden-which  has no early retirement and normal retirement at 
sixty-five-departure  rates before age sixty are typically well below 5 percent. 
Departure rates before the social security early retirement age are also much 
smaller in the United States and Canada, although in these countries employer- 
provided pension plans-with  typical early retirement ages between fifty-five 
and sixty-provide  incentive for some employees to retire at earlier ages. 
To understand further the importance of unemployment and disability pro- 
grams, the proportion  of men reporting that they are unemployed or disabled 
is shown in the lower panel for each country in figure  15. These panels also 
show the proportion  of  men who are employed and the proportion  who are 
retired. At age fifty-nine, for example, 22 percent of men are receiving unem- 
ployment or disability benefits in Belgium, 21 percent in France, 27 percent 
in  the Netherlands,  33 percent  in  the United  Kingdom,  and  37 percent  in 
Germany. Even  in Sweden, where departure rates  are relatively  low before 
age sixty, 24 percent are receiving unemployment or disability benefits at age 
10. In the Netherlands, the jump is not in fact at the social security retirement age but at the 
common employer  plan  early  retirement age.  In the  Netherlands, employer plans are virtually 
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Fig. 15C  Hazard and labor force participation rates (top),  and 
status of men by age (bottom), Italy 
Fig. 15D  Hazard and labor force participation  rates (fop),  and 
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Fig. 1SE  Hazard and labor force participation rates (top), and 
status of men by age (bottom),  the United Kingdom 
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fifty-nine. In the United States and Japan, on the other hand, only about 12 
percent are receiving unemployment or disability benefits at age fifty-nine. 
The relation between these programs and social security  is made clear in 
these figures as well. For example, in France, almost all those who are unem- 
ployed  at age sixty begin  to receive  social security benefits  at that age and 
thereafter  are  officially  classified  as retired. In the Netherlands, the United 
Kingdom, Germany, and Sweden, the large fraction of persons receiving dis- 
ability benefits before age sixty-five then starts to receive social security bene- 
fits and is classified as retired. 
In short, the conclusion is clear: as was apparent in the more detailed data 
for Germany, France, and the United  States, the collective evidence  for all 
countries combined shows that statutory social security eligibility ages contrib- 
ute in important ways to early departure from the labor force. In addition, un- 
employment and disability programs  serve as early retirement programs  in 
many countries. 
Implicit Tax Rates and Incentives to Retire 
The three illustrative country descriptions also suggested that the jump in 
the departure rate at the social security early retirement age is magnified by 
greater implicit tax penalties on wage earnings after social security eligibility. 
In particular, in France and Germany, with large taxes on continued work, the 
departure rate was much greater than in the United States, with a much smaller 
implicit tax  on work. We explore this  relation  further here, drawing  on the 
broader evidence from all the countries in the study. Labor force participation 
and retirement incentives for all eleven countries are summarized in table  1. 
The countries are ordered by the unused productive capacity of men between 
the ages of  fifty-five and sixty-five, which is explained above and shown in 
figure 4 above. The panels of figure 15 follow the same order. 
We emphasize, first, that, once employees  are eligible for social security 
benefits, a heavy tax burden is often imposed on persons who continue to work. 
The third to last column of the table shows the implicit tax rate on labor earn- 
ings at the early retirement age for each country. It is clear that, in many coun- 
tries, these tax rates are extremely high, in particular, in those countries at the 
top of  the table-those  with  the greatest unused  labor capacity. Thus, it is 
evident that the implicit tax on earnings can provide a strong incentive to leave 
the labor force. 
The fourth column of the table shows replacement rates at the early retire- 
ment age, which are also very large in many countries, especially those with 
the greatest unused labor capacity. 
Casual perusal of this table suggests a strong relation between unused labor 
capacity and the tax rate on continued work. To see the relation more clearly, 
it is useful to divide the countries into three groups: (1) those with high unused 
capacity (Belgium, France, Italy, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom); 
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Fig. 16  Sum of tax rates on work 
(3) those with low unused capacity (the United States, Sweden, and, in particu- 
lar, Japan). The average replacement rate at early retirement in the first group 
is 76.6 percent  of  median earnings and  the average tax on continued labor 
earnings in that year 91.8 percent. In the third group-with  the least unused 
labor capacity-the  average replacement rate at the early retirement age is 50 
percent and the tax rate on continued earnings 24.7 percent. These compari- 
sons point to a strong correlation between social security incentives and un- 
used capacity. 
There is no completely satisfactory way to summarize the country-specific 
incentives  for early retirement.  One crude measure is based on the implicit 
taxation of labor earnings once a person is eligible for social security benefits. 
We sum the implied tax rates on continued work beginning with the early re- 
tirement age-when  a person is first eligible for social security benefits-and 
running through age sixty-nine. We call this the tux force to retire. This mea- 
sure is reported in the second to last column of  table l.  The measure is shown 
in figure 16, in which the countries follow the same order as in table  1. This 
figure suggests once again that there is a strong relation between social security 
penalties on work and retirement. The average tax force to retire is 7.5 in the 
first group of countries in table 1 and 1.8 in the third group. 
The relation is formalized in figure 17, which presents scatter plots of the 
tax force to retire and unused  labor capacity between  age fifty-five and age 
sixty-five. Figures  17a and  17b are based on the sum of  tax rates from the 
early retirement age through age sixty-nine. Japan is included in figure 17a but 
excluded from figure 17b. Figure 17c is based on the sum of tax rates from age 
fifty-five to age sixty-nine in all countries. In either case, the relation is clear; 
there is a strong correspondence between  the tax force to retire and unused 
labor capacity. The relation is nonlinear, however. Thus, in the lower panels of 
each figure, unused capacity is plotted against the logarithm of the tax force. 
The solid line in these panels shows the “fit” of  the data by a regression  of 31  Introduction and Summary 
unused capacity on the logarithm of  the tax force. About 81 percent  of the 
variation  in unused capacity can be explained by  the early retirement to age 
sixty-nine tax force to retire when Japan is included, and 86 percent can be 
explained when Japan is excluded. When the age fifty-five to age sixty-nine 
tax force measure is used, 82 percent of the variation is explained, including 
Japan."  Thus, these data suggest a strong relation between social security in- 
centives to quit work and the labor force departure of older workers. 
The correspondence between the two should be understood in a broader con- 
text, however. There are two distinct issues. First, while it seems apparent that 
social security provisions do affect labor force participation, it also seems ap- 
parent from the country papers that, in at least some instances, the provisions 
were adopted to encourage older workers to leave the labor force. For example, 
anecdotal evidence suggests that, in some countries, it was thought that with- 
drawal of older employees from the workforce would provide more job oppor- 
tunities  for  young  workers.  This possibility  does not  by  itself  bring  into 
question  a causal interpretation  of the relation between plan provisions and 
retirement. To the extent that it is true, it simply says that, in some instances, 
the provisions were adopted for a particular reason. And the data show that 
they worked. 
The second issue, however, must temper a causal interpretation  of the re- 
sults. It could be argued that, to some extent at least, the social security provi- 
sions were adopted to accommodate existing labor force participation patterns, 
rather than the patterns being determined by the provisions. For example, early 
retirement benefits  could be provided  to support persons who are unable to 
find work and thus already out of the labor force. While this is surely possible, 
the weight of the evidence suggests otherwise. The German, French, and U.S. 
illustrations provide strong evidence that changes in plan provisions induced 
subsequent changes in retirement rates, not the other way around. 
The data in the second column of table  1 above can be interpreted in the 
light of both these issues. These data show the proportion of men who have 
left the labor force by age fifty-nine. This is before the official social security 
early retirement age in all countries, with the exception of Italy, where the early 
retirement age is younger in some instances. The nonparticipation rate at age 
fifty-nine varies from a high of 58 percent in Belgium to a low of 13 percent 
in Japan. A large part of the difference across countries can apparently be as- 
cribed  to differences  in disability  and unemployment  insurance  provisions. 
One might think of the labor force participation at this age as the level at which 
the force of the official social security provisions is first felt. As emphasized 
above, however, in many instances, these other programs effectively provide 
11. Japan appears to be an outlier when the first tax force measure is used, although not when 
the second tax force measure is used. That Japan appears to be an outlier in one version may reflect 
a weakness of our summary measure of  unused capacity. A rather high share of Japan's labor force 
is self-employed and not covered by the social security system, and the very high participation rate 
at older ages in Japan is largely in the secondary sector and is often part-time. 32  Jonathan Gruber and David A. Wise 
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Fig. 17  Unused capacity vs. tax force 
Note:  ER = early retirement. 
early retirement at younger ages than the official social security early retire- 
ment age. It is perhaps not surprising that these levels are also strongly related 
to the unused capacity measures. 
Why were these provisions adopted? One possibility, consistent with the 
first issue above, is that they were part of an effort to facilitate the early with- 
drawal of older employees from the labor force. And, like the social security 
provisions themselves, they worked. Again, this does not by itself question the 
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Fig. 17 (cont.)  Unused capacity vs. tax force 
true, it suggests a reason for adopting the provisions. But these pseudwxuly 
retirement programs could also have been adopted to accommodate preexisting 
labor force departure rates, and this possibility must temper a causal interpreta- 
tion of the relation between program provisions and retirement. Again, how- 
ever, the data for the three illustrative countries provide strong evidence of  a 
causal link between provisions and retirement. Ultimately, the extent of  any 
reverse causality cannot be determined by these descriptive statistics; it can be 
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Conclusions 
The populations in all industrialized countries are aging rapidly, and individ- 
ual life expectancies  are increasing. Yet  older workers  are leaving the labor 
force at younger and younger ages. In several countries in our study, participa- 
tion rates for men aged sixty to sixty-four have fallen from over 70 percent in 
the early 1960s to less than 20 percent now. This decline in labor force partici- 
pation magnifies population  trends, further increasing the number of  retirees 
relative to the number of persons who are working. Together, these trends have 
put enormous pressure on the  financial  solvency of  social security systems 
around the world. Ironically, we argue, the provisions  of  the social security 
systems themselves typically contribute to labor force withdrawal. 35  Introduction and Summary 
It is clear that there is a strong correspondence between the age at which 
benefits are available and departure from the labor force. Social security pro- 
grams often provide generous retirement benefits at young ages. In addition, 
the provisions of these programs often imply large financial penalties on labor 
earnings beyond the social security early retirement age. Furthermore, in many 
countries, disability and unemployment programs effectively provide early re- 
tirement benefits before the official social security early retirement age. We 
conclude that social  security program  provisions  have indeed contributed to 
the decline in the labor force participation  of older persons, substantially re- 
ducing the potential productive capacity of  the labor force. It seems evident 
that,  if  the trend toward early retirement is to be reversed,  a move that will 
almost surely be dictated by demographic trends, changing the provisions of 
social security programs that induce early retirement will play a key role. 
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